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Sociology lags considerably behind political science in its comparative research 
on European societies. The reason lies partly in the dependence of modern social 
science on quantitative data bases. These tend to be collected nationally, by 
national agencies, and the informal phenomena studied by much sociology are 
highly vulnerable to different national definitions. Some of the same problems 
beset political science, but there are more formal institutions that, even when 
they differ across countries, can at least be understood in relation to each other. 
The situation has begun to improve in recent years, as more data are collected by 
the European Commission, and as a number of large, multi-national  research 
projects have been launched. There is now a European Sociological Association, 
and two major general journals (European Sociological Review and European 
Societies) that carry the continent’s name in their titles, in addition to some 
specialized ones in related fields (like urban studies). 
Enough material exists to enable us to talk broadly about the major changes 
that have taken place during these decades across western Europe, but also to 
some extent central and eastern Europe too. Attention will here be concentrated 
on those social trends that seem particularly salient for the study of politics. My 
starting point will be occupational structure. Although this dominant theme of 
classical sociology has tended to be neglected by much recent research in favour 
of such areas as deviance, gender and the formation of identities, working life 
remains fundamental to social organization and in particular to politics. In fact, 
the theme of gender is easily accessed through consideration of changes in 
occupations, and considerable attention will be devoted to it here. This leads in 
turn to consideration of the family, then on to other aspects of demography 
including immigration and cultural diversity. This relates clearly to the final 
theme that will be discussed: the state of religion in Europe. In the conclusions 
some of the political implications of these, discussed through the article, will be 
brought together. 
  
Occupational change 
Although the gradual decline of industrial employment in favour of various 
kinds of services had been predicted since the mid-20th century, and ‘post-
industrial society’ had been proclaimed since the early 1970s (Bell 1972),  
European politics around the time of the founding of West European Politics was 
still firmly rooted in industrialism. This was especially the case in the southern 
parts of western Europe and in France, where the move from rural agricultural 
employment to urban and industrial was still taking place while the shift into 
services was also beginning. But the generalization holds true in the north, and 
even in the oldest industrial nation, the United Kingdom, for the making of a 
population engaged in industrial work had been part of the same process that 
had produced the forms of the modern polity and its characteristic institutions of 
mass parties, rational bureaucratic public administration and, less generally, 
democracy. So powerful were the forces engaged in forging these historically 
unique forms of both working life and politics that subsequent  changes leave us 
with the implications of ‘post-‘industrialism rather with a social form definable 
in its own terms. Alongside this, contemporary political organization reflects the 
decline of the politics of industrial society rather than the rise of anything new. 
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The story in the eastern half of the continent is clearly different, but less so 
than for politics as such. Here too a central issue of previous decades had been 
the shaping of an industrial population, even more emphatically so than in the 
west, as the initial state of rural ‘backwardness’ was more intense, and the 
political determination to industrialize more all-embracing. The same drive also 
produced a deliberate avoidance of post-industrial tendencies, as a result of 
which the former state-socialist countries ‘rejoined’ Europe as thoroughgoing 
examples of industrializing societies while their western neighbours had already 
departed considerably from that social form. 
Table 1 presents data for all countries that had produced broadly 
comparable statistics around the time in the mid-1970s when West European 
Politics was launched. Although it was then still common to consider ‘services’ as 
a single ‘tertiary’ sector, it is possible to examine data for three of what have 
become known as the four services sectors, distinguished more or less by their 
distance from manufacturing (Crouch 1999: ch 4). The table therefore shows, 
separately for men and women, employment in five sectors: 
I. agriculture and mining; 
II. manufacturing, public utilities and construction; 
III. distribution; the movement of the products of industry and therefore still 
close to manufacturing activities: transport and all sales activities (including 
shops); postal services and telecommunications. Unfortunately, until recent years 
it has been common to include within these activities many of those that we now 
identify as sector VI (below); 
IV. business services: activities that are not themselves part of the 
manufacturing process, but which are important to it: banks, insurance, and 
other financial activities; legal services; various design and consultancy activities; 
cleaning, security and maintenance. (The growth of this sector includes some 
quite illusory shifts from manufacturing to services, as manufacturing firms 
concentrating on their core business have sub-contracted, rather than employed 
directly, ancillary services.) 
V. Social and community services, that is services considered to contribute to 
some general good going beyond the individuals who receive them (like 
education or health). In some cases it is not easy to identify an individual user 
(maintenance of the environment; police services). Because of their communal 
character, many of these services have historically been provided by public 
authorities.  
VI. Personal services, considered to benefit solely the individuals who consume 
them: cultural and sporting entertainment, domestic cleaning, repair of domestic 
goods, etc. It is not possible to distinguish this sector in aggregated statistics until 
the late 1990s, parts of it being included in sector III.  
 
 (Table 1 about here) 
 
Outside southern and eastern Europe, only Ireland had a primary (largely 
agricultural) sector employing more than 20% of the workforce at that time, 
though it was still above 10% in Austria, Finland, France and Norway. 
Manufacturing, construction, etc was the largest sector in all countries except 
Greece. It employed more than 40% in Austria and West Germany, as well as 
three eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), 
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though not East Germany. Everywhere else, except Greece, it employed between 
30 and 40%. Its position within the world of male employment was even more 
significant. Only in some central European countries did female employment 
exceed a third of the total for the sector.  
Distributive services and communications accounted for 20-25% of the 
workforce throughout almost all western Europe, but less in central Europe and 
Portugal. It employed relatively high proportions of women except in Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal, while women formed a majority in 
Czechoslovakia and Finland. Business services were a very small sector almost 
everywhere. Emerging as the clear second in size to manufacturing was 
employment in the largely public social and community services sector. In two 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Sweden) this was already employing 
more than 30% of the workforce. Unlike the other sectors, this one was 
dominated by female employment: only in Belgium, West Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands and Spain were women in a minority, and in Finland and Swden 
they clearly dominated the sector. The relative size of this sector, combined with 
the higher levels of female employment in sector II in parts of central Europe, 
largely determines the gender structure of the workforce at this period. In only 
three countries – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Finland – did women constitute 
more than 45% of employment. In Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain they 
accounted for less than 30%, with Greece barely above that level. 
In general the mid-1970s constitute the peak of male industrial employment 
and the mid-20th century forms of politics associated with it. Challenging the 
industrial sector, as it were, is sector V: where the former is primarily male, 
concerned with the politics of production, and (in the west) largely privately 
owned, the latter is mainly female, mainly in public ownership and generating a 
politics of service provision.   
The equivalent situation around 1990 is shown in Table 2. This year is both 
halfway through the intervening period and immediately following the collapse 
of the Soviet bloc. The classification base for reporting occupational structure is 
the same as in 1975, but data are available for more countries. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Agriculture and mining remain important in most central and southern 
European countries as well as Ireland, but are generally declining. Sector II is 
also declining, but remains the biggest single one in all but the Scandinavian and 
some north-western European countries (as well as the isolated case of 
Lithuania), where sector V is now the biggest. (In two south-eastern countries, 
Croatia and Greece, the distributive sector is larger than both these.) The 
countries with the most dominant industrial sectors are all in central Europe, 
with only Austria and West (but not East) Germany joining them at over 35% of 
all employment. Only Norway has gone below having 25% of employment in 
sector II. The distributive sector remains at between 20 and 29% for all western 
European countries, rather less for most central ones - particularly Lithuania and 
Romania. Business services remains a small sector, but exceeds 10% in the three 
commercially oriented economies of the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. 
Sector V accounts for more than 20% except for Croatia, Greece, Romania and 
Slovakia. The Nordic countries, France, Belgium and the Netherlands have 
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reached 35% working in this sector, as has East but not West Germany. Only in 
Greece and Italy does this sector not have a female majority. In the economy 
overall women have achieved a 45% presence in two kinds of country: all the 
Nordics (and, almost, the UK) and the majority of central Europeans. There is a 
sharp difference in the profile of these two groups: in the first female 
employment is concentrated in a large sector V with a low presence in sector II; 
in the latter many women also work in manufacturing. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
By the end of the period, 2005, it begins to be possible to examine sector VI 
in its own right. Table 3 therefore finally gives data for all six sectors. With the 
collapse of industrial employment in parts of central Europe, there has been 
some rise in the role of agriculture there; in Bulgaria and Romania this sector has 
again become the largest one. With the exception of Italy and Portugal, only 
central European countries still have more than 30% of their workforce in the 
industrial sector. Italy and Portugal, along with Ireland and Spain, are also the 
only western economies where this sector still employs more than sector V, while 
Latvia is the only central European case of sector V being larger than sector II. In 
the Netherlands, Norway and the UK sector III is now larger than sector II. In 
western Europe the transition to post-industrial society may be said to be 
complete. The business services sector, while still small, has grown rapidly, being 
above 15% of employment in Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
UK. This sector has now begun to grow in central Europe, it remaining very 
small only in Greece and Portugal. Sector V now accounts for more than 35% of 
employment in Scandinavia and Belgium. It remains much lower in both central 
and southern Europe, giving a very clear geo-political character to this sector’s 
position. We can for the first time inspect employment in personal services. In a 
mixed group of countries - south-west Europe together with Austria, Croatia, 
France and Ireland - it accounts for more than 5%. Like many other services 
sectors, it is dominated by female employment, the sole exception being Ireland. 
Overall, female employment has only passed 50% in one small country – 
Estonia – but it is above 45% in all but nine countries, and is above 40% in all 
except Greece and Italy. In general the process of change in eastern and central 
Europe since the collapse of state socialism can be seen as moving towards the 
social structures of western countries. However, the state socialist economies had 
higher proportions of women in work than did most western European ones; in 
this respect they resembled the Nordic countries, the UK and USA more closely 
than they did the countries that make up the bulk of the pre-enlargement EU. In 
the majority of central European cases, 'westernization' has involved a reduction 
or stagnation in women's labour force participation, despite the gradual shift 
towards more services employment that might imply feminization. This is 
mainly because cuts in public spending have hit services that care for young 
children and the elderly, tasks which then tend to fall on women. At the same 
time female labour-force participation has been rising in the west, suggesting a 
true two-sided convergence between the different parts of Europe on this issue, 
rather than just a movement towards western patterns in CEE. 
 
 
 5 
Political implications of occupational change 
Political sociology has long recognized the implications for political cleavages, 
voting patterns and party organization of the decline of manual and rise of non-
manual work. But this change is easily confused with some of the implications of 
sectoral change. The class structure of industrializing society, on which the 
political cleavages surrounding democratization were based in virtually all 
Europe, was itself an extension of the social order of the factory: a small owning 
and managing group, assisted by a junior administrative and clerical team, both 
separated by working environment from a manual workforce, which was itself 
divided by one or two broad skill demarcations. Although only a minority of the 
adult population anywhere ever worked in factories of this kind (an even smaller 
minority if account is taken of both genders), it provided the language and 
perceptual apparatus through which the whole population was structured, 
particularly for political purposes. This factory-based social structure emerged 
from the private practices of employers, but became embedded in government 
practice as much 20th century social policy (e.g. pensions, social insurance and 
industrial relations institutions, qualification systems for vocational education) 
took on its assumptions about how industrial populations were to be classified. 
This further ramified their use in political organization and the structuring of 
cleavages. 
Post-industrial occupational structure challenges this situation in two ways. 
The more obvious is the fact that the 19th and 20th century social order of the 
factory now accounts for an even smaller part of the workforce than it did when 
it was dominant. Less obviously, but perhaps more important, is the fact that 
there is no single equivalent paradigm sector in the new economy. To a 
considerable extent the office has replaced the factory as the paradigm 
organizational form, extending across several sectors and across the 
public/private divide. This produces a hierarchy of managers and professionals 
(the relative size of these groups varying considerably), and a large junior 
administrative and clerical workforce that may be larger or smaller than the 
professional one. The multiple gradations of this structure have so far not 
produced cleavages resembling those between manual workers and 
administrative staff that generated the politics of the 20th century, except that 
there is a strong tendency for lower levels of office hierarchies to be heavily 
female, upper levels male, producing a gender rather than a class division. It is 
therefore relevant that gender has become more important than class in many 
political debates in recent times. 
The role of the office varies in the different sectors from being the central 
location of organizations’ activities (the business services sector, public 
administration) to being, as it is in the factory, ancillary (much of distribution, 
education, health, personal services). Also, the various services sectors have 
rather different internal structures. In two of them (business services and social 
and community services) the ‘mass’ workforce primarily comprises 
professionally qualified workers. In the distributive and private services sectors 
there is considerable heterogeneity, but there is often a less skilled workforce 
more like the factory model, though it is ambiguously definable as manual. The 
only one of these sectors large enough to be a potential paradigm is social and 
community services, but throughout Europe (and elsewhere in the advanced 
world) the majority provision of these services is funded by the state rather than 
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through market forces. (This remains largely true even if service delivery is 
privatized.) It is difficult for a non- or only partially market sector to stand as the 
paradigm form of work organization in societies where work is primarily rooted 
in markets. 
A further form of division within contemporary workforces concerns 
different contract statuses, with some persons enjoying salaried positions and 
some security of employment, while others are in a number of precarious 
positions: temporary contracts, highly insecure tenure, certain kinds of self-
employment (including ‘false’ self-employment), and indeed illegal employment, 
which plays a larger role in many economies than is usually acknowledged 
[Schneider]. These divisions between the relatively secure and the insecure often 
correspond to demographic divisions. The young and the old are both likely to 
concentrate in precarious jobs, an extreme case being the concentration of the 
young in temporary contracts in Spain. Ethnic minorities and recently arrived 
immigrants are likely to be heavily concentrated in insecure locations, including 
the black economy. In central and southern Europe women are also often in 
insecure jobs; in northern Europe they are more likely to be in fairly secure but 
part-time posts. START HERE 
This emerging pattern of occupational divisions has a number of 
implications for politics in European countries. Should we see post-industrial 
society as one without major cleavages, as some have argued? Or, do cleavages 
exist, but are not achieving direct political expression  because they are not 
acquiring explicit form in ways that are amenable to political mobilization?  If 
that is the case, are they acquiring implicit expression; that is, are political issues 
around work being politically presented in non-occupational forms? 
Alternatively again, do cleavages in post-industrial societies exist, but in fields 
unrelated to work? These questions go well beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, but the issues raised here provide essential background for 
addressing issues of political cleavage and organization. Coverage of political 
sociology questions in the first 30 years of West European Politics usually drew on 
a Rokkanian framework of the sociology of 20th century cleavages, but often to 
record their political decline (Crewe 1983; Wolinetz 1979). However, only one 
article, and an early one (Ersson and Lane 1981) actually discussed the decline of 
industrial and the rise of services employment. And there has been little that 
analyses the potential implications of the new structures being erected as 
opposed to those of the decline of the old. Some authors insisted that social 
structure has become less important than movements based on value 
orientations (Flanagan and Dalton 1984), but others provided evidence to contest 
this (Reiter 1993). If anything, the strongest arguments have come from those 
showing that, though the old cleavages might be declining, in the absence of 
anything clearly replacing them they retain considerable importance (Mair 1984).  
These discussions have of course concentrated on west European politics. In 
those countries that experienced a state socialist period there was, at the level of 
official ideology and social policy organization, an ‘inverted’ class structure 
(Lane), whereby manual workers were represented as the key group to be served 
by public policy, though the structures created to give expression to this special 
status did not have an autonomous capacity to express the group’s self-defined 
interests. The collapse of that system has therefore produced considerable 
confusion in the articulation of occupational interests, which feeds through into 
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the rather unstable character of post-socialist party structures. This is not simply 
a result of the suppression of autonomous political organization during 
dictatorships: following the collapse of reactionary dictatorships in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, democratic party politics rapidly acquired a familiar western 
European, occupation-based form (Montero 1998). It is therefore difficult to 
establish relationships between occupational structure and political cleavage in 
CEE countries, even though that structure remains less subject to the 
fragmentation of post-industrialism than in western European countries.  
 
Changes in gender roles 
As already indicated, one of the candidates for consideration as a new source of 
cleavage in post-industrial societies is gender, partly as an occupationally related 
category, partly sui generis. There is evidence - probably related to the different 
skill levels used by the sectors - that incomes are higher in business services and 
social and community services than in other sectors. However, even though 
more women work in these higher-paying sectors than men, their incomes are 
lower [REF]. Clearly, women are found predominantly in the lower-grade 
positions. Among older generations this may partly reflect the fact that male 
educational achievements used to be superior to female. However, virtually 
everywhere this has been subject to major change, and among younger 
generations the genders' educational performances have been reversed (Shavit 
etc). Another, and continuing, reason for women occupying the lower rungs in 
hierarchies is of course that their working careers are interrupted by childbirth 
and, in several countries, associated periods of either part-time work or 
temporary exit from the labour force [women’s work refs].  
This is changing as a number of factors increase the opportunities for 
women to enter the paid workforce, these factors operating very diversely in 
different European countries. First, the automation of the kitchen that took place 
in the west with the growth of electrical domestic appliances during the post-war 
decades of growing prosperity raised the productivity of domestic labour just as 
factory automation did to industrial labour. Second, families today have fewer 
children, reducing the quantity of childcare needed. Third, particularly in eastern 
Europe where there was far less kitchen automation, women acquired the 
'double burden' [ref] of doing their housework when they finished their paid jobs 
for the day; sometimes their husbands may have shared these tasks, but not 
often. Indeed, there is also research evidence in western Europe that men have 
been slow to accept that their wives’ engagement in paid work implies many 
additional domestic duties for themselves. In some countries (particularly the 
Netherlands and the UK) women tend to work part-time in paid employment 
and part-time at housework and child care. Fourth, other family members might 
help as a family obligation, for example grandmothers helping mothers with 
childcare. Finally, other people (nearly always other women) might carry out the 
employed woman's domestic tasks by themselves being paid to do the work. It is 
this last that leads to the employment-creating spiral of women's employment 
[Esping-Andersen]. 
The jobs that are created by this last process are in childcare and in other 
care services for the sick and the elderly that have traditionally been performed 
as unpaid domestic tasks by women. These services can be organized in very 
different ways, with major implications for how the work is reported in official 
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statistics. These are often jobs in the community and social services sector, or in 
personal services, including food preparation, replacing domestic labour. But 
some of these activities are traded informally among women [Mingione ]. For 
example, cleaners and child-minders are usually paid informally by the women 
who employ them; they have no contract of employment, do not appear in any 
lists of persons employed, and are not registered as taxpayers. The size of this 
kind of female employment is therefore completely under-estimated in official 
statistics. 
As the above Tables have shown, there remains considerable diversity 
among countries in their patterns of female employment. Most can be explained 
in the following ways. Some countries, particularly the Nordic ones but to some 
extent also the UK and France, developed extensive direct services within the 
welfare state. These countries have evinced particularly strong growth of 
women's employment in the social and community sector (EspingAndersen), 
with secondary effects as the women recruited by this expansion created further 
demand for female labour services as carers, etc. Rather similarly, in central and 
eastern Europe places of employment provided childcare facilities for working 
mothers, the carers being other employed women. Elsewhere in Europe, the 
welfare state placed a stronger emphasis on transfer payments (pensions, 
disability and sickness allowances, etc) than on direct service provision (for 
example, Germany, Italy) [Daly, Saraceno]. This restricted primary job growth 
among women, and therefore the multiplier process was also weaker. In these 
countries, primarily those in which the Roman Catholic church had a strong 
influence on social policy, acceptance of inter-generational family obligations 
remains strong, and women are likely to carry out as unpaid domestic work the 
activities that enable their daughters, nieces, or sisters to enter the labour force. 
The work is being carried out just as much as if it was being rewarded, but as 
with the informal economy it does not register in the job statistics. 
These divergences among countries are relatively recent. U 
As the above Tables have shown, in the 1970s there was less variation in 
women’s employment between the various parts of western Europe, except for 
the south (Crouch 1999: ch 2; Naumann 2006). High levels of female paid work 
were found only in central Europe. It was from the late 1960s onwards that 
nearly every democratic country in western Europe started to see a major growth 
in welfare state expenditure. Countries differed in the size and speed of that 
growth, but more importantly they differed (as has been noted) in the form of the 
expenditure, with major implications for whether it created primarily female 
employment in social and community services. These differences are beginning 
to decline now, as female participation in formal employment in these services is 
growing virtually everywhere, and in western Europe very few if any political 
forces pursue policies that would deliberately inhibit women’s employment. But 
past legacies remain prominent. 
As already noted, the trajectory in CEE has been different. Particularly in 
Poland, [REFS]Catholic social policy has been able to exert political influence 
only since the collapse of state socialism. This has resulted in a number of 
policies that discourage female employment, bringing female participation down 
from its formerly high levels.  
Returning to the west, the turn of the decade of the 1960s and 1970s also 
saw, in almost all these countries, a major development in women’s 
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consciousness, with a significant and enduring feminist movement that was to 
have, and continues to have, extensive implications for politics and policy. The 
relationship between the two factors – the growth in social services employment 
and feminism – is complex. Neither can be said to have ‘caused’ the other, but 
they have combined with major consequences. Although there are many 
examples of gender-based social movements and pressure groups, there are very 
few gender-based political parties. Given that political allegiances tend to be 
rooted in various forms of social segregation, it is difficult in societies where men 
and women live together for gender to articulate its conflicts in party form. 
There have long been gender differences in political loyalties. For most of 
the 20th century, where democracy existed women tended to ally themselves to 
right-of-centre parties, especially those with links to Christian churches, more 
than did men (Mayer and SMithy 1985). There are two good sociological reasons 
for this. First, left-of-centre parties usually defined themselves in relation to the 
concerns of manual workers in manufacturing industry, who were 
predominantly male. Second, in the 20th century division of labour between the 
genders, women’s lives were mainly centred on family, home and local 
community, the values of which were strongly upheld by churches. These 
differences were only of emphasis: some women were in paid employment, or 
even if they did not, they shared the life perspectives of their husbands. Also, in 
Catholic countries specifically Christian labour movements struggled against 
secular ones for the allegiance of males too. But an overall difference between 
men and women did exist. 
These patterns have changed considerably in recent years. In most 
European polities gender difference in voting patterns and political allegiances 
have either disappeared or even been reversed [Northcutt and Flaity 1985]. The 
rise in female labour-force participation, and (in western Europe) the decline in 
both religious observation and in churches’ insistence on women having 
primarily domestic roles, have undermined the former basis of segregation. 
Meanwhile, women dominate employment in social and community services, 
and left-of-centre parties are particularly associated with supporting public 
funding of these services: these factors taken together lead women to vote 
increasingly for these parties.   
 
Demographic trends and family changes 
Alterations in women's position have been among a number of major changes in 
the structure and behaviour of families. These need to be set in the context of 
wider changes in population patterns. As Table 4 shows, Europeans are living 
longer than they did a few decades ago. The trend is not so strong among men in 
some central and eastern European countries, where economic dislocation since 
the early 1990s temporarily had a negative effect. In some parts of eastern Europe 
and Russia, male life expectancy actually went down.  
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
As death rates decline, so do birth rates (see Table 5, which shows total 
fertility for women of child-bearing age in a number of European countries). This 
generalization holds across the whole continent, and the current pattern of low 
 10 
birth rates distinguishes Europeans from most other world regions: only Japan 
shows similar patterns.  
(Table 5 about here) 
 
The geography of European demography contains some paradoxes. Until 
the decades here under review, birth rates in southern Europe were considerably 
higher than in northern. This was easily explicable: industrialization and 
growing prosperity started first in north-west Europe; and across the world and 
over time a strong association between modernization and declining fertility is 
one of the safest generalizations in the social sciences. Also, much of southern 
Europe is Roman Catholic, and that church had maintained an opposition to 
artificial contraception long after Protestant churches had abandoned it. Birth 
rates were also low in central and eastern Europe, which were less industrialized 
than much of the west, but these countries were engaged on a rapid 
industrialization process. 
The following twin processes then seem to have reversed some of these 
generalizations [(Crouch 1999: ch 6?, plus others cited there)]. First, the welfare-
state developments described above with relation to the Nordic countries and, to 
a lesser extent, France and the UK, began to make it easier for women to combine 
work with motherhood. Birth rates began to rise. Second, couples in southern 
Europe, Germany and other countries that were not pursuing employment-
friendly social care policies, who were just as keen to exercise freedom in their 
lifestyles as their northern counterparts, did so by reducing the number of 
children for whom they would have to be responsible. By the 1990s the highest 
birth rates in western Europe were in Scandinavia, the lowest in Italy and Spain – 
a complete historical reversal. 
Meanwhile, the upheavals in CEE countries have simply accentuated past 
trends to low birth rates. If these had previously been a result of the female 
‘double burden’, since the change of regime they have resulted from the high 
level of economic uncertainty. Birth rates in this part of Europe are lower even 
than in the south.  
 
Smaller households 
In nearly all European countries, therefore, young people are forming couples 
later and having fewer children ([Coleman PLUS OTHERS]). This trend then 
joins with others to produce another change: households are becoming smaller. 
The other causes include a growing tendency for young adults and elderly 
people to live by themselves rather than in the same accommodation as other 
members of their families. This is the result of increased general prosperity, 
improving house-purchase loan systems, and (important for elderly people) both 
improved health in old age and improving care facilities. There is however 
diversity within this common trend. For example, in southern and eastern 
Europe birth rates are lower than in the north west; but young adults are more 
likely to live with their parents. Causes of these developments are clearly 
complex. 
Decreased household size also results from a common tendency towards a 
decline in the number of married people ([Coleman]). This has several causes: the 
rise in the age of marriage discussed above; an increase in the number of couples 
who do not have a formal marriage; and a rise in divorce. These phenomena can 
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be seen in all European countries, and in the rest of the industrialized world. 
There is again however considerable diversity. Divorce rates in particular are far 
higher in northern and eastern Europe than in the south. On the other hand, 
growing longevity in most parts of Europe mean that couples who stay together 
can expect to have more years together before widowhood. 
 
The ageing of the population 
Greater longevity combined with low birth rates produce what is often called the 
ageing of the population, as the average age rises. Western Europe and Japan are 
experiencing this in a way unparalleled elsewhere in the world or in human 
history.  This theme primarily enters political debate in the form of a so-called 
pensions crisis: if the proportion of the population in work falls in relation to the 
proportion living on retirement pensions, there are problems for the funding of 
pension schemes that rely on the earnings of today’s workers to fund the 
incomes of today’s pensioners (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000). However, it is less 
often noticed that low birth rates also mean reduced numbers of the dependent 
young, and therefore reduced pressure on childcare and education budgets. A 
major demographic crisis of public spending occurs only if both elderly and child 
populations are high, with an earlier dip in birth rates having produced a small 
working and tax-paying population. This is not the case in contemporary 
Europe. 
Also less noticed is the contribution that a large generation of relatively 
wealthy retired people make to sustaining their adult, working children at a time 
of increased economic insecurity [Kohli]. The prolonged period of post-war full 
employment, accompanied by major improvements in state retirement pension 
provision immediately after World War II and then again after the 1970s have 
meant that, for the generations that entered the workforce during that era, old 
age has not been a time of poverty [Albertini]. This has been a remarkable change 
from previous generations. In most western European countries this was also a 
period of growth in home ownership. The majority of today’s elderly among 
ordinary working people have considerably more financial resources than their 
predecessors. The role of this stabilizing force in a contemporary economy and 
labour market characterized by uncertainty is a subject that would repay 
research. 
This factor is likely to prevent the emergence of a generational cleavage. 
Such a cleavage is sometimes predicted because of the ostensible conflict 
between those enjoying good pensions and those who come after them, funding 
those pensions from their taxes while probably not being able to look forward to 
having them themselves. In addition, younger people are aware that if their 
parents do not have sound pensions, the burden of their care will probably fall 
back on to them. They are therefore more likely to respond by insisting on the 
maintenance of generous pensions and their continuation until their own 
generation, rather than welcome tax cuts that could follow a reduction in pension 
cover. This logic probably explains why campaigns against cuts in pensions for 
public employees in France have attracted sympathy from parts of the public 
who do not themselves benefit from them (Bonoli 1997). 
 
Immigration and cultural pluralism 
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Extensive immigration into western Europe from less prosperous parts of the 
world has been a long-standing phenomenon. In recent years this has extended 
to the Nordic countries, Italy and Spain. The latter, for so long countries of 
emigration, have found themselves attractive to people in northern Africa, 
geographically close. Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, there are now also 
major movements of people from eastern and central Europe towards the west. 
Unlike the migrations of the 1960s, which took place when there were 
labour shortages in western Europe, these new movements are taking place at a 
time when there is high unemployment in much of the latter region. Meanwhile, 
half a century of immigration into some parts of western Europe has produced 
second and third generations of people descended from immigrants, but born 
and brought up in Europe, sometimes intermarrying and forming new families 
with people from the host society. Although such cultural mixing has always 
been a characteristic of many European countries, this longer European history 
has also been marked by major episodes of intolerance, hatred, and bloodshed. 
Elements of this continue to dog the creation of multicultural societies today, as 
dominant majorities and immigrant or post-immigrant minorities try to come to 
terms with each other. These difficulties sometimes create major political issues, 
and anti-immigrant parties, or factions within existing parties, have become 
among the major innovations on the party-political scene (Messina 1990; West 
European Politics 1994).  
In some cases these new cultural issues affect societies where tension still 
exists from older patterns of difficult relations between majorities and older 
settled minorities. Relations between Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland and between Basques and Spaniards in northern Spain have been among 
the most persistent in western Europe. It is however in eastern and central 
Europe that this kind of tension remains strongest. During the 1990s the former 
state of Yugoslavia collapsed under the weight of extreme violence bordering on 
attempted genocide among its diverse cultural and religious (Catholic, Orthodox, 
and Muslim) populations. These have now formed separate states more or less 
following these cultural contours, with continuing tensions. Elsewhere such 
issues as the place of Hungarians in Romania, of Turks in Bulgaria, of Russians 
in the Baltic states, of Gypsies in many countries, continue to produce means of 
political mobilization, sources of discrimination and occasional outbursts of 
violence. 
 
The decline of European religion 
While there is debate about what indicators should be used, there is little doubt 
that religion is an institution in major decline throughout Europe - except among 
some of the immigrant communities mentioned above. This trend became 
manifest first in a decline in attendance at religious services by people who 
continued to regard themselves as members of churches or other religious 
organizations, or at least as believers. More recently however there has also been 
a decline even in affirmations of a belief in God [REF]. Further, the European 
situation contrasts very considerably with that in the USA, where religious belief, 
church attendance, and the political power of religious organizations have been 
growing very strongly indeed. Europe, along with Japan, stands out as a world 
region of religious decline at a time when the institution is rising in prominence 
in the USA, the extensive Islamic world, and some other areas. 
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There are however important differences in the patterns. In the UK, and 
more recently the Netherlands, religious observance of all kinds has sunk to very 
low levels. In the Nordic countries, while regular church attendance is the lowest 
in the world, large majorities of the population are confirmed into the church and 
opt to pay a voluntary religious tax to fund their churches. In some other 
countries, including Italy, Ireland, and Poland, church attendance remained high 
until the past decade or so [REFERENCE].  
The decline in Poland is particularly striking, as the Catholic Church had 
been a major source of Polish national identity during the years of Soviet 
domination, and had played a major part in undermining the state socialist 
regime.  It had been widely expected that there would be a major Christian 
renaissance, not only in Poland, but throughout central and eastern Europe, 
where churches (variously Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran) had remained a 
stable symbol of popular identity during years of disorientation. At the level of 
political influence this has often been the case, religious leaders acquiring a 
dominant role in social policy in particular. However, this trend has contradicted 
that in popular behaviour. In fact, in Poland and elsewhere the Christian 
churches have declined rapidly in central and eastern Europe following the fall 
of communism, as those countries have joined a general European trend. 
In general the history of religion in modern Europe has followed a clear 
pattern (Martin). Where the dominant church made strong demands on the 
loyalty of populations and exercised a major political influence, people became 
divided between supporters of that church role and outright opponents of it. 
This was largely the case with the Catholic Church, and also of Calvinist 
Protestant churches, which tend to flourish in embattled situations where 
Protestants face strong Catholic, and/or secular or other opposition (the 
Netherlands, Scotland, Northern Ireland, to some extent Switzerland; outside 
Europe in South Africa). National churches that became content to express the 
common life of a nation state without making political claims other than securing 
their own quiet position in that life tended to attract neither the support nor the 
hostility to which the Catholic Church was liable. Declining numbers took an 
interest in their activities, but few bothered to challenge their claim to a quiet 
place in national life. This has been the fate of the Church of England in England 
and the Lutheran churches in the Nordic countries. In a somewhat different way, 
it has also been the pattern in Eastern Europe, where the Orthodox Church takes 
the form of a number of national churches. 
Where religions of various kinds express the identity of people against, or 
at least separately from, an alien political power, that religion can attract 
powerful loyalties as in the dominant Catholic case (ibid). Here however this is 
without the antagonism attracted by a church's exercise of power over people, as 
this is experienced as an alternative to a more remote political authority. What 
such religions have to fear is the passing into insignificance of the identity that 
they express. There are many, varied examples of this phenomenon. The Catholic 
Church has been in this position where a Catholic population has been 
dominated by non-Catholics - as in Ireland (long dominated by the British) and 
Poland (dominated, among others, by the Russians). Those countries did not 
experience strong secularist movements. Long after Greek independence from 
Turkey, the Greek Orthodox Church still plays a similar role for Greeks.  
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Religions today often play this powerful cultural identity role for ethnic 
minorities, and an earlier expression of internal local cultural diversity is 
replacing that of regionalism in many European societies today. Jews have long 
been an example of this. Following the more recent waves of immigration, Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, the distinctive forms of Christianity found in Africa and 
the Caribbean, and some others, have provided valuable identities among 
immigrant groups and their descendants, becoming important constituents of the 
cultural pluralism mentioned above. Typically, therefore, ethnic minorities have 
far higher patterns of religious observance than native populations. 
 
Conclusion 
The societies of central and eastern Europe have joined the general history of 
capitalist economic development when it is at a moment of considerable change. 
The late 19th and 20th century economy built around male workers in 
manufacturing industry is giving way to one based around various services. This 
is a particularly strong challenge for the former state socialist countries, as 
services played a particularly small role in employment in their economies. 
Meanwhile, both parts of Europe have left behind them the forms of economic 
organisation that provided basic security to their working populations in the 
decades after World War II: Keynesian demand management in the west, a 
centrally planned economy in the west. Both now face the more turbulent global 
market economy. The struggle among populations for security in this context 
partly takes the form of the protective role of the welfare state, stronger in 
northern Europe than anywhere else, and partly that of different levels of 
security provided by different forms of work contract and associated labour 
rights. To some extent these areas become fields of distributional and therefore 
political conflict, as different demographic and occupational categories achieve 
different levels of social rights.  
For most of the 19th and 20th centuries the politics of most European 
countries was shaped by two major conflictual forces. The first was struggle 
between religions, or between religion and secularism. The second was class 
struggle, first between landed aristocracy and the rising commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisie, and then between the latter and the rising manual 
working class rooted in manufacturing and mining industries. The party systems 
of Europe still bear the imprint of these struggles more than of any other. But 
they all refer to events of the past. This is not because there are no struggles over 
religion and class in 21st century society, but they concern different issues. First, 
relations between ethnic and religious minorities and their host societies take the 
form of potential clashes between cultures rather than religious conflict in the 
strict sense. Second, the class conflicts around which party politics is organized 
still concern the role of the industrial working class.   
The political agenda has responded to change. Issues of globalization and 
the transition of employment forms from those designed for large-scale 
manufacturing to those designed around the new services sector are important 
everywhere, from the prosperous economies of western Europe to those in the 
centre and the east entering the scene of these new issues while they are still 
embroiled in the transition from state socialist to capitalist economies. Changes 
in the role of women, and challenges for the welfare state created by both those 
changes and the wider shifts in employment patterns are similarly important. 
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Immigration is also a political issue. In this last case both racist or populist 
parties or fractions of parties representing ethnic minorities have certainly 
entered the political stage. But otherwise party structures and rhetoric have 
remained largely static. The new issues of the transition to the services economy, 
and the new social groups forged by them, have so far found little autonomous 
expression. In the west this may be reflected in growing popular apathy towards 
politics and an apparent growing gulf between political classes and the mass of 
the population. In central and eastern Europe we see a difficulty in establishing 
stable party structures that might express people's conflicts and aspirations, and 
instead a rapidly changing series of personal cliques formed around individual 
political leaders. 
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